Traveling in Utopias: Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantis* and H.G. Wells’ *A Modern Utopia*

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**Abstract:** Though within the literary genre, arriving at utopia often requires travel, from a perspective internal to the utopia described, the liberty to travel often takes a dubious status. As illustrated by Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantis*, once established, the introduction of novel customs and ideas into the classical utopian society, via the traveler, can only threaten the stability and justice already achieved. It is on these grounds that severe restrictions on the travels of strangers and citizens about and beyond Bensalem find their justification. Utopias of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries may appear more palatable to our modern impulses to the extent that restrictions on travel have been lifted. Citizens of H.G. Wells’ *A Modern Utopia*, for instance enjoy the utmost freedom of movement. While Wells couches this liberty of travel in terms of acknowledging a natural liberty, I contend that, first because the modern Utopia is global, travel no longer threatens the stability of the State as it might for a geographically, hence culturally, isolated Utopia. Second, Wells’ global Utopia can allow its citizens license to travel as a luxury because the functions and understanding of travel has shifted from an activity pursued predominately for cognitive and cultural purposes to an activity with pursued predominately for leisure.

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illustrated by Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantis*, once established, the introduction of novel customs and ideas into the classical utopian society can only threaten the stability and justice already achieved. It is on these grounds that severe restrictions on the travels of strangers and citizens about and beyond Bensalem find their justification.

Utopias of the 19th and early 20th centuries may appear more palatable to our modern impulses to the extent that restrictions on travel have been lifted. For instance, in stark contrast to Francis Bacon’s Bensalem, H.G. Wells’ ‘modern’ Utopia gives “the utmost freedom of going to and fro” (31). “In the modern Utopia travel must be in the common texture of life” (36). The contrapositive also holds: restrictions on the freedom of movement prove to be a common feature of twentieth century dystopias.

While Wells couches this liberty of travel in terms of acknowledging a natural liberty, I contend that, because the modern Utopia is global, travel no longer threatens the stability of the State as it might for a geographically, hence culturally, isolated Utopia. Wells’ global Utopia can allow its citizens license to travel as a luxury because the telos of travel has shifted. Travel—as a means to experience and learn of other cultures, their beliefs, manners, institutions, so as to bring to bear this new, critical, distanced perspective upon one’s own culture—these functions of travel have dissipated in the global utopia. Additionally, new economic imperatives underpin the liberty of travel: Wells’ modern Utopia must allow all its citizens liberty to travel to the extent that the modern Utopia relies upon a mobile workforce. In what follows I provide an analysis of Bacon’s *New Atlantis* and H.G. Wells’ *A Modern Utopia* to illustrate this shift in the function of travel and to hint at some of the broader literary and social implications this shift may have had for utopianism. Prior to this discussion, a brief summary of the understanding of ‘travel’ at work in this project is in order.
(1) The Concept of ‘Travel’

In his study, *A General Economy of Travel: Identity, Memory and Death*, Afshin Hafizi develops a concise, but fecund, understanding of travel. Travel can be conceptualized as contact with the unfamiliar, the crossing of the border between home/ the domestic and the not-home/ the foreign. Hafizi (1-2) develops a continuum centered on the degree to which the foreign is domesticated by the traveler, or the degree to which the travel transforms the traveler. Encompassing a variety of permutations, a restricted economy of travel always involves a return home, the crossing of borders for the purpose of rendering the unfamiliar, familiar (or the foreign, domestic). A general economy of travel involves the resistance to, or impossibility of, returning home, or rendering what is foreign, domestic. In this framework—travel need not be intentional, and it need not require traversing a great spatial or temporal distance.

Using this framework, Hafizi’s project is to provide a critical analysis of recent literary narratives of immigration and diasporas. However, the understanding of travel as contact with the unfamiliar works well with utopia literature as its one of its purposes has been the presentation of a radically heterogeneous place and/or time for the purposes of transforming the manner in which its audience regards its contemporary and familiar society. Given this potentially transformative power of travel upon which utopia literature rests, the question arises—in what way is this transformative power of travel rendered innocuous internal to the utopia society being described, so that the utopian society is not itself disrupted by the travels of its citizens in the same manner utopia literature may unsettle the reader’s view of her contemporary society?

(2) Francis Bacon: The Purpose of Travel and Travel Restrictions in *New Atlantis*

In Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantis*, the restriction of travel, both on those who would travel to, or travel from, Bensalem evidences itself immediately as the narrator’s vessel enters a Bensalem port:
“straightways we saw diverse people, with bastons in their hands, as it were forbidding us to land” (152). These strangers receive permission to land only on the condition that all members of the party are Christian, are not pirates, nor have unlawfully shed blood within forty days. Moreover, the Bensalem ‘welcoming’ party keeps their distance from the vessel fearing the travelers carry with them infectious diseases. Even when the party obtains permission to come ashore, they are quarantined in the Stranger’s House. Once given license to explore the city, they are prohibited from going within a mile and a half “from the walls of the city” (158).

As Gorman Beauchamp indicates, such restrictions on contact with foreigners exemplify the tendency of a utopia to “reject the conflict-model of society . . . in favor of an equilibrium model” (219). If the utopia is truly just, if it is truly a Utopia, then any change introduced can only be for the worse. Consider how the Governor of the Stranger’s House justifies the prohibitions and procedures regarding travel. The law-giver of Bensalem, King Solamona, in “recalling to his memory the happy and flourishing estate wherein this land then was, so as it might be a thousand ways altered to the worse, but scarce any one way to the better . . . did ordain the interdicts and prohibitions which we have touching the entrance of strangers” (166). This remark obviously implies that the presence of strangers, who may bring with them anything from infectious diseases to non-Christian beliefs and manners, could only alter Bensalem for the worse.

More importantly, citizens of Bensalem are subject to travel restrictions as well: “the king has forbidden to all his people navigation into any part that was not under his crown” (167). Such persons might return as strangers, i.e., having adopted the beliefs and manners (contracted the diseases of) foreign cultures. Only the Merchants of Light, Fellows of Salomon’s House clandestinely travel to foreign lands in order to appraise the State of progress in the arts, sciences, and technology. But it would be incorrect to say that the Merchants of Light posses the liberty to travel; it is only through
travel that they can fulfill their duty to the State. Their journeys are appointed, the duration and purpose of their stay determined.

Not surprisingly, the tasks of the Merchants of Light exemplify Bacon’s own advice for the traveler in his essay “On Travel.” If one is young, travel is for “education;” if one is older, travel is for “experience” (74). The purpose of travel for young and old is cognitive, for the acquisition of knowledge. Certainly one does not (or ought not) travel merely for diversion or relaxation. Much of Bacon’s advice concerns how the traveler can make efficient use of the time spent in any particular locale, learning as much as possible in as little time: “let him not stay long in one city or town, more or less, as the place deserveth” (75); “as for the acquaintance to be sought in travel, that which is most of all profitable is acquaintance with the secretaries and employed men of ambassadors, for so . . . he shall suck the experience of many” (76). Acquaintance with ‘persons of quality’ residing where one intends to travel allows the traveler to “abridge his travel with much profit” (76). What is to be brought back to the home country are not souvenirs, new gestures or mannerisms, tales of one’s adventures, but knowledge pure and simple. One’s travels should inform one’s counsel, one’s discourse. The traveler ought only to “prick in some flowers of that he hath learned abroad into the customs of his own country” (76). While in this context, Susan Bruce (xxviii) claims that New Atlantis provides an exemplary Baconian travelogue, the narrator exemplifying Bacon’s ideal traveler, we can add, the Merchants of Light also exemplify Bacon’s ideal traveler.

The importance of travel for the acquisition of knowledge finds additionally expression in Bacon’s New Organon. In Book One, Bacon painstakingly details the impediments, past and present, to the development and implementation of the method by which natural philosophy could be set on a sure and steady path towards a comprehensive knowledge of nature. Undue reverence of the ancients, particularly the work of Aristotle, ranks high as a chief obstacle; Bacon, thus, draws attention to ways in
which the age of the ancients is deficient to our own. To this end, aphorism LXXII contrasts the “narrow and meager knowledge either of time or place” of the ancients to that of Bacon’s contemporary time, when “both many parts of the New World and the limits on every side of the Old World are known, and our stock of experience has increased to an infinite amount” (70-1). Crucially, this ‘narrow and meager knowledge’ of the ancients is “the worst thing that can be, especially for those who rest all on experience” (70). Aphorism LXXXIV underscores the great advantage the moderns derive from global exploration: “nor must it go for nothing that by the distant voyages and travels which have become frequent in our times many things in nature have been laid open and discovered which may let in new light upon philosophy” (81). The observations and experience afforded by global travel supplies the wealth of materials required for the employment of the inductive method Bacon lays out and illustrates in Book Two of The New Organon; in short, these materials contribute substantially to Bacon’s “Natural and Experimental History for the Foundation of Philosophy,” as he calls it in the plan he sketches in The Great Instauration (17).¹

Two additional common motives for travel in Bacon’s time ought to be considered: economic and imperialistic. Because Bensalem is “sufficient and substantive . . . to maintain itself without any aid at all of the foreigner” (165) trade with other nations is unnecessary; hence, there are no economic pressures or incentives for travel. Travel with imperialist designs encompasses many of the economic reasons and cultural reasons for travel; a nation may wish to expand its borders to acquire natural resources and new markets for its surplus goods and/or to promote its culture and values. In this context it is noteworthy that the restrictions on travel in New Atlantis are preceded by a discussion of three once powerful nations: Atlantis (America), Coya (Peru), and Tyrambel (Mexico). Coya and Tyrambel “were mighty and proud kingdoms in arms, shipping and riches: so mighty, as at one time . . .

¹ For a more detailed account of the importance of natural history for the advancement of the sciences, the manner in which it was to be organized and the various works of Bacon that serve as partial contributions to this foundation, see Perez Zagorin (103-6).
they both made two great expeditions” (163). The people of Tyrambel ventured to the Mediterranean Sea. The result: “there never came back either ship or man from that voyage” (164). The voyage of Coya would have been equally disastrous “if they had not met with enemies of greater clemency” (164). If military defeat were not enough, “the Divine Revenge overtook not long after these proud enterprises. For within less than the space of one hundred years, the great Atlantis was utterly lost and destroyed” (164). This back story underscores the dangers of adventurous travel—the collapse of political and cultural hegemony even in the homeland.

The nation of Bensalem entertains no imperialist designs against other nations. So in what sense might it also be referred to as a new Atlantis? Arguably, the imperialist designs of Bensalem pertain to the instauration of man’s dominion over nature—and not over other men; it is not the military that realizes the extension of Bensalem’s dominion, it is Salomon’s House. Though he does not explicitly reference Bacon’s New Atlantis, Charles Whitney’s analysis of Bacon’s use of the term ‘instauratio’ corroborates such a reading. In the context of Roman usage, ‘instauratio’ refers to a founding that is a re-founding; hence, the connection between the original Atlantis and the new Atlantis that has (re)attained the glory of the original (372-73). In the context of Biblical use, ‘instauratio’ refers to the restoration of Solomon’s temple and the link between the rebuilding of the Temple, the “‘rebuilding’ of Israel and to a Christian instauration of all things in the apocalypse” (377). In New Atlantis, the governor explicitly links Salomon’s House to Solomon’s Temple (167). To this extent, the new Atlantis is also a new Jerusalem, Ben-Salem, ‘son of Jerusalem.’ Bacon’s New Atlantis exemplifies the advice of The New Organon—that it is nobler for kings to patronize man’s dominion over nature (science) than for kings to pursue man’s dominion over man (imperialism) (118-19). Again, the implicit suggestion contained in the fate of Atlantis is that the overextension of one’s political boundaries leads to the decline of great powers—one more reason for restricting travel to scientific purposes.
In one respect, Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantis* qualifies as what Wells will describe as a kinetic utopia—the advancements of learning and technological progress promise an element of dynamism and progress. However Bacon clearly envisions his utopia with regards to both its religion and political structure as static. Implied then is the assumption that technological advancements would not, in and by themselves, introduce cataclysmic changes to the political, economic, cultural structure. Of course, careful reading of *The New Organon* demonstrates that Bacon was not so naïve as to the potential social and political impact of new technology. Speaking of the relatively new technologies of printing, gunpowder and the magnet, Bacon writes “these three have changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world: the first in literature, the second in warfare, the third in navigation; whence have followed innumerable changes, inasmuch as no empire, no sect, no star seems to have exerted greater power and influence in human affairs than these mechanical discoveries” (118). Likely then, the rationale for Salomon’s House oversight of scientific discoveries and the technologies they yield rests not merely in the need for a centralized body to gather, store and conduct the experiments Bacon’s inductive method requires but additionally rests in the need for a centralized authority to anticipate, manage and monitor the social changes such technologies potentially introduce. Hence, the discoveries the Merchants of Light return with from their travels undergo the same scrutiny as all of the discoveries of Salomon’s House: “we have consultations, which of the inventions and experiences which we have discovered shall be published, and which not: and we take all an oath of secrecy, for the concealing of those which we think fit to keep secret” (184).

In sum, travel for economic and imperialist motives must be prohibited in Bacon’s Utopia. Travel is economically unnecessary; the drive to extend the nation’s borders beyond those geologically proscribed can only sow the seeds of the Utopia’s demise. With regards to travel for cultural exchange, including exchange of knowledge and technology, such travel is essential (and for Bacon, perhaps, the purpose of travel) but must, like any advancement in learning, be strictly monitored. For an established,
but geographically isolated Utopia, travel must be severely restricted in the name of the Utopia’s stability. And for those few allowed to travel, their travel is not the expression of personal liberty (a freedom from interference from the State) but rather the expression of their specific duty to the State.

(3) The Liberty of Travel and Function of Travel in H.G. Wells A Modern Utopia

H.G. Wells’ A Modern Utopia represents a pioneer attempt to establish a utopia consistent with the principles of political liberalism: an emphasis on negative freedom (liberty) and the individualism that negative freedom acknowledges and to some extent is supposed to result from negative liberty:

To the classical Utopists freedom was relatively trivial. . . . But the modern view, with its deepening insistence upon individuality and upon the significance of its uniqueness, steadily intensifies the value of freedom, until at last we begin to see liberty as the very substance of life, that indeed it is life, and that only the dead things, the choiceless things, live in absolute obedience to law. (28)

Wells immediately applies these principles to the freedom of movement, specifically—travel: “to the modern mind it can be no sort of Utopia worth desiring that does not give the utmost freedom of going to and fro” (31). “In the modern Utopia travel must be in the common texture of life. . . . [It] is a bright and pleasant particular in which a modern Utopia must differ again, and differ diametrically, from its predecessors” (36).

With this background in mind, I analyze the specific instances and functions of travel as detailed in A Modern Utopia to attempt to show that to a great extent, travel has lost much of its potential as a source of cultural and political criticism. Therefore, one can argue that though Wells’ Utopia is certainly ‘kinetic’ in that all citizens possess freedom of movement, this is because travel itself no longer introduces social conflict with respect to the Good. In other words, travel itself is not the source of the
dynamism Wells’ Utopia possesses; nor does the liberty to travel any longer pose a significant threat to the continuance of the utopia.

In Wells’ time, the technology of travel had advanced substantially since Bacon’s day. Characteristic of much of Wells’ *A Modern Utopia*, the Owner of the Voice extrapolates from tendencies in our home-world, introducing further futuristic, but technologically foreseeable, modes of transportation into the Modern Utopia. All but the most uninhabitable and inaccessible regions are safe and convenient for travel. The *global* nature of the Utopia with its universal language and currency secures the convenience and safety of travel to most far-flung destinations. A vast transportation network connects all regions of the globe. Monorails make possible movement from place to place at speeds of 200 to 300 mph. For local travel, the Utopia has roadways, bicycle paths, and walkways.

Given these features of the Modern Utopia, the opportunity for travel for pleasure abounds and will be taken advantage of; for, as the narrator observes: “whenever economic and political developments set a class free to travel, that class at once begins to travel” (36). The impulse to travel is universal; to that extent, the liberty of travel, the maximum allowable freedom of movement consistent with the preservation of some degree of personal privacy manifests itself as a natural right that, as noted above, the World State must acknowledge as a necessary condition to qualify as a Utopia. I quote at length the type and purpose of travel the Owner of the Voice imagines the citizens of Utopia routinely engaged in:

To go into fresh climates and fresh scenery, to meet a different complexion of humanity and a different type of home and food and apparatus, to mark unfamiliar trees and plants and flowers and beasts, to climb mountains, to seen the snowy night of the North and the blaze of tropical midday, to follow great rivers, to taste the loneliness in desert places, to traverse the gloom of
tropical forests and to cross the high seas, will be an essential part of the reward and adventure of life, even for the commonest of people. (36)

Travel is the ‘reward’ and ‘adventure’ of life. It is a chief manner in which one’s leisure time (the reward for work) is spent. The experience of diverse climes, diverse with respect to terrain, weather, population density, architecture, fauna and flora, and ‘complexion of humanity,’ these provide the spice of life.

However, travel for leisure is not the only motive for travel in the Modern Utopia. That persons have the ability to travel significant distances relatively quickly allows for “all sorts of fresh distributions of the factors of life” (39). The extensive transportation infrastructure makes possible the functional and economic specialization of entire regions of the globe. Some regions will be primarily industrial; others residential; others agricultural; others uncultivated. Persons can commute to an industrial center for work; take their sleep and meals in a residential area; spend their more extensive leisure time in a destination resort or uncultivated clime. Given these factors, “the population of Utopia will be a migratory population beyond any earthly precedent” (38). It is this feature that permits, for a time, the Owner of the Voice and the botanist to pass unnoticed in this world, despite their shiftless appearance.

Of course, a migratory population differs significantly from a population that travels for leisure. As the two protagonists find themselves pressed for money, and hence seeking work, an additional essential motive for travel appears—travel for gainful employment. Citizens of Utopia are, with a few exceptions, not idle. They must engage in a minimum amount of work to obtain a living wage from the State. Should a citizen live in an area where work in her trade is scarce, she may go to the post-office to find a region within a few hundred miles where her labor is needed. Once a region is selected, the State issues the necessary “passes for travel and coupons for necessary inn accommodations” (104-5). The
State remains appraised of the movements of its citizens, the narrator contending that this is not a significant infringement on the freedom of movement. Such relocations, apparently, are not infrequent: “Such a free change of locality once or twice a year from a region of restricted employment to a region of labor shortage will be among the general privileges of the Utopian citizen” (105). On the surface, this disclosure implies that the impulse to travel is so strong that persons will welcome a change their locale as frequently as twice per year. At another level, such frequent migration is symptomatic of the problem of surplus labor. Though population control mitigates the amount of surplus labor, technological innovations leading to increased productivity continues to create chronic unemployment, which, in the Modern Utopia, is absorbed by State projects. The State serves a reserve employer that utilizes the surplus labor. Travel under these auspicious sounds even more dubious: “All over the world the labor exchanges will be reporting the fluctuating pressure of economic demand and transferring workers from this region of excess to that of scarcity” (106). The World State, the labor exchanges, transfer workers as necessary. In other words, the Modern Utopia requires a mobile, flexible workforce, given the pressures of surplus or obsolete labor created by continual industrialization and innovation.

Travel, in this context, as in Bacon’s *New Atlantis*, is not so much an expression of negative liberty as it is an imperative. The two protagonists, at minimum, experience travel as such. Like any typical unemployed Utopian citizen, they inquire at the post-office for work. This act sets the plot of *A Modern Utopia* in motion; the protagonists become caught up in the bureaucracy of the World State which soon discovers they are strangers: “such is the eye of the State that is now slowly beginning to apprehend our existence as two queer and inexplicable particles disturbing the fine order of its field of vision” (115). Both are sent to Lucerne where low-skilled laborers are needed. Later they are sent to London to meet their Utopian doubles. The State directs the pair’s movements despite the general, overtly stated principle that, even with regard to economic life, individuals retain the privilege of liberty of movement.
It is almost at the close of the novel that we learn, via the meeting between the Owner of the Voice and his Utopian double, that the essential administrative posts of the State are filled by ‘samurai’. Admission to this order is based on merit. Its members follow ‘the Rule,’ which provides a list of qualifications to gain admittance, a list of prohibitions, and a list of duties. Travel reappears as one of the duties the samurai must fulfill: “For seven consecutive days in the year, at least, each man or woman under the Rule must go right out of all the life of man into some wild and solitary place, must speak to no man or woman, and have no sort of intercourse with mankind” (202). Though the discussion occurs in the context of the Utopian religion, indicating that the obligation to solitary sojourn in the wild, uninhabited regions of the globe has a spiritual function, the other reasons enumerated for this travel all aim towards ensuring the samurai faithfully and efficiently fulfill their duty to the State.

First, the journey establishes a test by which to secure “a certain stoutness of heart and body in the members of the order, which otherwise might have laid open to too many timorous, merely abstemious, men and women” (202). It should be noted that the traveler wanders without a map, weapons, books, pen, or money. And it is no great addition to note that the travel also is to “ensure good training and sturdiness of body and mind” (202). Secondly, the sojourn functions as a period of rest from daily administrative tasks and annoyances. The traveler forgets for a time her troubles, complications at work, and returns “physically clean—as though you had your veins and arteries cleaned out. And your brain has been cleaned too” (206). But most importantly, the yearly separation from civilization and all human intercourse renews the higher sense of purpose the samurai must keep within their vision as they set about their daily tasks in the workaday world. Speaking of the effect the sojourn has on him, the narrator’s double, a samurai himself, remarks “one put’s one’s self and one’s ambitions in a new pair of scales” (205) and “all this busy world that has done so much and so marvelously, and is still so little—you see it little as it is” (204).
To summarize, first and foremost, in Well’s *A Modern Utopia* travel is regarded as the expression of the human impulse for novelty, for escape. Persons of all walks of life zip from destination to destination to experience new climes, new scenery, and new complexions of persons. The imperative to travel placed on the samurai arguably fulfills the same purpose, with perhaps only the added function of ensuring and maintaining that the order contains only persons with the body, mind and outlook appropriate to their social function and position. Though the reason for travel differs, like the Merchants of Light, the State obliges the samurai to travel. Samurai pick where their sojourn shall take them; however, they must take the yearly sojourn somewhere. Of course, a great deal of travel is migratory; persons moving from region to region seeking work. There remains some uncertainty as to the extent to which the State itself directs the migratory workforce as the State stands as the reserve employer when little work is to be found. But the fact of surplus labor necessitates a migratory population. One could argue, certainly, it is a misnomer to call such movement ‘travel’ anymore than one would call the obvious increase in commuting in Wells’ Utopia or our own world an increase in ‘travel’. However, if one bristles at such movement being called ‘travel,’ the implication is that, travel, in the modern sense, is by definition movement undertaken in one’s free-time. With this move one quickly enters into the dialectic between work and free-time so elegantly captured by Adorno in his essay “Free Time” (187-97).

**Conclusions**

It may be asked: in what sense in Wells’ Utopia kinetic then? Wells’ ‘Owner of the Voice’ specifies straightaway the manner in which the Utopia to be laid out is ‘modern’:

The Utopia of a modern dreamer must needs be differ in one fundamental aspect from the Nowhere and Utopias men planned before Darwin quickened the thought of the world. Those were all perfect and static States, a balance of happiness won for ever against the forces of
unrest and disorder. . . . But the modern Utopia must be not static but kinetic, must shape not as a permanent state but as a hopeful stage, leading to a long ascent of stages. (11)

One may be immediately struck by the invocation of Darwin. The discovery of human evolution, the necessity of evolution to the survival of the species, demands a kinetic Utopia. To a great extent Wells’ *A Modern Utopia* occupies the reader with details of the State management of reproduction—the chief goal being to prevent invalids, criminals, drug addicts from reproducing so as to promote a continual improvement of the species: “The way of Nature is for every species to increase nearly to its possible maximum of numbers, and then to improve through the pressure of that maximum against its limiting conditions by the crushing and killing of all the feebler individuals . . . . It is a conceivable and possible thing that this margin of futile struggling, pain and discomfort and death might be reduced to nearly nothing without checking physical and mental evolution, by preventing the birth of those who would in the unrestricted interplay of natural forces be born to suffer and fail” (124-25).² John S. Partington argues that Wells’ *The Time Machine* also underscores this point by detailing the lamentable fate of a completely idle class—the Eloi. The key ‘kinetic’ element of Wells’ modern Utopia concerns the evolutionary progress of the species as managed by the State. In this respect a similarity between Wells’ and Bacon’s utopia emerges—the management of key dynamic elements within society by a centralized authority.

But in stark contrast to Bacon, the function of travel in Wells’ utopia is no longer cognitive. The traveler does not threaten the stability of the State of which he is a citizen when he returns with stories of the diverse climes and animals he has encountered on his journey. The traveler acquires no knowledge or experience that can be brought to bear critically upon the State; no potential

² For a brief account of Wells’ stance on eugenics at this period of his career, see John S. Partington, “Wells: A Political Life” (521-22).
contamination of foreign diseases (customs, manners, institutions) that would upset the political order will be imported. The traveler now becomes the commuter, the tourist, the migrant worker, or the wanderer. Though perhaps more of a symptom than root cause, the shift in the personal and social function of travel from predominately a cognitive activity to a predominately leisure activity represents one significant threat to the utopian imagination, the contemporary decline of which has been noted by scholars such as Jameson (2005), Jacoby (2005) and Kumar (2010). Put simply: because the Utopia is global, is a World State, there is no place ‘outside’ the State to which one can travel. The political liberty of the freedom of movement is established as an essential political liberty just when travel itself becomes politically and socially innocuous.

Works Cited


